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ABSTRACT
Despite the deployment of preventive security mechanisms to pro-
tect the assets and computing platforms of users, intrusions even-
tually occur. We propose a novel intrusion survivability approach
to withstand ongoing intrusions. Our approach relies on an orches-
tration of fine-grained recovery and per-service responses (e.g.,
privileges removal). Such an approach may put the system into a
degraded mode. This degraded mode prevents attackers to reinfect
the system or to achieve their goals if they managed to reinfect
it. It maintains the availability of core functions while waiting for
patches to be deployed. We devised a cost-sensitive response se-
lection process to ensure that while the service is in a degraded
mode, its core functions are still operating. We built a Linux-based
prototype and evaluated the effectiveness of our approach against
different types of intrusions. The results show that our solution
removes the effects of the intrusions, that it can select appropriate
responses, and that it allows services to survive when reinfected.
In terms of performance overhead, in most cases, we observed a
small overhead, except in the rare case of services that write many
small files asynchronously in a burst, where we observed a higher
but acceptable overhead.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Operating systems security; Mal-
ware and its mitigation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite progress in preventive security mechanisms such as cryp-
tography, secure coding practices, or network security, given time,
an intrusion will eventually occur. Such a case may happen due to
technical reasons (e.g., a misconfiguration, a system not updated,
or an unknown vulnerability) and economic reasons [39] (e.g., do
the benefits of an intrusion for criminals outweigh their costs?).
To limit the damage done by security incidents, intrusion re-
covery systems help administrators restore a compromised system
into a sane state. Common limitations are that they do not preserve
availability [23, 27, 34] (e.g., they force a system shutdown) or that
they neither stop intrusions from reoccurring nor withstand re-
infections [23, 27, 34, 71, 74]. If the recovery mechanism restores
the system to a sane state, the system continues to run with the
same vulnerabilities and nothing stops attackers from reinfecting
it. Thus, the system could enter a loop of infections and recoveries.
Existing intrusion response systems, on the other hand, apply
responses [20] to stop an intrusion or limit its impact on the system.
However, existing approaches apply coarse-grained responses that
affect the whole system and not just the compromised services [20]
(e.g., blocking port 80 for the whole system because a single compro-
mised service uses this port maliciously). They also rely on a strong
assumption of having complete knowledge of the vulnerabilities
present and used by the attacker [20, 62] to select responses.
These limitations mean that they cannot respond to intrusions
without affecting the availability of the system or of some services.
Whether it is due to business continuity, safety reasons, or the user
experience, the availability of services is an important aspect of a
computing platform. For example, while web sites, code reposito-
ries, or databases, are not safety-critical, they can be important for
a company or for the workflow of a user. Therefore, the problem
that we address is the following: how to design an Operating Sys-
tem (OS) so that its services can survive ongoing intrusions while
maintaining availability?
Our approach distinguishes itself from prior work on three fronts.
First, we combine the restoration of files and processes of a service
with the ability to apply responses after the restoration to withstand
a reinfection. Second, we apply per-service responses that affect the
compromised services instead of the whole system (e.g., only one
service views the file system as read-only). Third, after recovering a
compromised service, the responses we apply can put the recovered
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service into a degraded mode, because they remove some privileges
normally needed by the service.
The degraded mode is on purpose. When the intrusion is de-
tected, we do not have precise information about the vulnerabilities
exploited to patch them, or we do not have a patch available. The
degraded mode allows the system to survive the intrusion for two
reasons. First, after the recovery, the degraded mode either stops the
attackers from reinfecting the service, or it stops the attackers from
achieving their goals. Second, the degraded mode keeps as many
functions of the service available as possible, thus maintaining
availability while waiting for a patch.
We maintain the availability by ensuring that core functions of
services are still operating, while non-essential functions might not
be working due to some responses. For example, a web server could
have "provide read access to the website" as core function, and "log
accesses" as non-essential. Thus, if we remove the write access to
the file system it would degrade the service’s state (i.e., it cannot
log anymore), but we would still maintain its core function. We
developed a cost-sensitive response selection where administrators
describe a policy consisting of cost models for responses and mali-
cious behaviors. Our solution then selects a response that maximize
the effectiveness while minimizing its impact on the service based
on the policy.
This approach gives time for administrators to plan an update
to fix the vulnerabilities (e.g., wait for a vendor to release a patch).
Finally, once they patched the system, we can remove the responses,
and the system can leave the degraded mode.
Contributions. Our main contributions are the following:
• We propose a novel intrusion survivability approach to with-
stand ongoing intrusions and maintain the availability of
core functions of services (section 3.1 and 4).
• We introduce a cost-sensitive response selection process to
help select optimal responses (section 5).
• We develop a Linux-based prototype implementation by
modifying the Linux kernel, systemd [65], CRIU [12], Linux
audit [29], and snapper [63] (section 6).
• We evaluate our prototype by measuring the effectiveness
of the responses applied, the ability to select appropriate
responses, the availability cost of a checkpoint and a restore,
the overhead of our solution, and the stability of the degraded
services (section 7).
Outline. The rest of this document is structured as follows. First,
in section 2, we review the state of the art on intrusion recovery and
response systems. In section 3, we give an overview of our approach,
and we define the scope of our work. In section 4, we specify the
requirements and architecture of our approach. In section 5, we
describe how we select cost-sensitive responses and maintain core
functions. In section 6, we describe a prototype implementation
which we then evaluate in section 7. In section 8, we discuss some
limitations of our work. Finally, we conclude and give the next steps
regarding our work in section 9.
2 RELATEDWORK
Our work is based on the concept of survivability [37], and specifi-
cally intrusion survivability, since our approach focuses on with-
standing ongoing intrusions. We make a trade-off between the
availability of the functionalities of a vulnerable service and the
security risk associated to maintaining them. In this section, we
review existing work on intrusion recovery and response systems.
2.1 Intrusion Recovery Systems
Intrusion recovery systems [23, 27, 34, 71, 74] focus on system in-
tegrity by recovering legitimate persistent data. Except SHELF [74]
and CRIU-MR [71], the previous approaches do not preserve avail-
ability since their restore procedure forces a system shutdown, or
they do not record the state of the processes. Furthermore, except
for CRIU-MR, they log all system events to later replay legitimate
operations [23, 34, 74] or rollback illegitimate ones [27], thus provid-
ing a fine-grained recovery. Such an approach, however, generates
gigabytes of logs per day inducing a high storage cost.
Most related to our work are SHELF [74] and CRIU-MR [71].
SHELF recovers the state of processes and identify infected files
using a log of system events. During recovery, it quarantines in-
fected objects by freezing processes or forbidding access to files.
SHELF, however, removes this quarantined state as soon as it re-
stores the system, allowing an attacker to reinfect the system. In
comparison, our approach applies responses after a restoration to
prevent reinfection or the reinfected service to cause damages to
the system.
CRIU-MR restores infected systems running within a Linux con-
tainer. When an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) notifies CRIU-MR
that a container is infected, it checkpoints the container’s state (us-
ing CRIU [12]), and identifies malicious objects (e.g., files) using
a set of rules. Then, it restores the container while omitting the
restoration of the malicious objects. CRIU-MR differs from other ap-
proaches, including ours, because it uses a checkpoint immediately
followed by a restore, only to remove malicious objects.
The main limitation affecting prior work, including SHELF and
CRIU-MR, is that they neither prevent the attacker from reinfecting
the system nor allow the system to withstand a reinfection since
vulnerabilities are still present.
2.2 Intrusion Response Systems
Having discussed systems that recover from intrusions and showed
that it is not enough to withstand them, we now discuss intrusion
response systems [5, 20, 62] that focus on applying responses to
limit the impact of an intrusion.
One area of focus of prior work is on how tomodel intrusion dam-
ages, or response costs, to select responses. Previous approaches
either rely on directed graphs about system resources and cost mod-
els [5], on attack graphs [20], or attack defense trees [62]. Shameli-
Sendi et al. [62] use Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) methods
to select an optimal response based on such models.
A main limitation, and difference with our work, is that these
approaches apply system-wide or coarse-grained responses that af-
fect every application in the OS. Our approach is more fine-grained,
since we select and apply per-service responses that only affect
the compromised service, and not the rest of the system. Moreover,
these approaches cannot restore a service to a sane state. Our ap-
proach, on the other hand, combines the ability to restore and to
apply cost-sensitive per-service responses.
Some of these approaches [20, 62] also rely on the knowledge of
vulnerabilities present on the system and assume that the attacker
can only exploit these vulnerabilities. Our approach does not rely on
such prior knowledge, but relies on the knowledge that an intrusion
occurred, and the malicious behaviors exhibited by this intrusion.
Huang et al. [28] proposed a closely related approach that mit-
igates the impact of waiting for patches when a vulnerability is
discovered. However, their system is not triggered by an IDS but
only by the discovery of a vulnerability. They instrument or patch
vulnerable applications so that they do not execute their vulner-
able code, thus losing some functionality (similar to a degraded
state). They generate workarounds that minimize the cost of losing
a functionality by reusing error-handling code already present. In
our work, however, we do not assume any knowledge about the
vulnerabilities, and we do not patch or modify applications.
3 PROBLEM SCOPE
This section first gives an overview of our approach (illustrated
in Figure 1), then it describes our threat model and some assump-
tions that narrow the attack scope.
3.1 Approach Overview
Since we focus our research on intrusion survivability, our work
starts when an IDS detects an intrusion in a service.
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Figure 1: High-level overview of our intrusion survivability
approach
When the IDS detects an intrusion, we trigger a set of responses.
The procedure must meet the following goals: restore infected
objects (e.g., files and processes), maintain core functions, and
withstand a potential reinfection. We achieve these goals using
recoveries, responses, and policies.
Recovery Recovery actions restore the state of a service (i.e., the
state of its processes and metadata describing the service)
and associated files to a previous safe state. To perform recov-
ery actions, we create periodic snapshots of the filesystem
and the services, during the normal operation of the OS.
We also log all the files modified by the monitored services.
Hence, when restoring services, we only restore the files
they modified. This limits the restoration time and it avoids
the loss of known legitimate and non-infected data.1 To per-
form recovery actions, we do not require for the system to be
rebooted, and we limit the availability impact on the service.
Response A response action removes privileges, isolates compo-
nents of the system from the service, or reduces resource
quotas (e.g., CPU or RAM) of one service. Hence, it does
not affect any other component of the system (including
other services).2 Its goal is to either prevent an attacker to
reinfect the service or to withstand a reinfection by stop-
ping attackers from achieving their goals (e.g., data theft)
after the recovery. Such a response may put the service into
a degraded mode, because some functions might not have
the required privileges anymore (or limited access to some
resources).
Policies We apply appropriate responses that do not disable core
functions (e.g., the ability to listen on port 80 for a web
server). To refine the notion of core functions, we rely on
policies. Their goal is to provide a trade-off between the
availability of a function (that requires specific privileges)
in a service and the intrusion risk. We designed a process
to select cost-sensitive responses (see section 5) based on
such policies. Administrators, developers, or maintainers
provide the policies by specifying the cost of losing specific
privileges (i.e., if we apply a response) and the cost of a
malicious behavior (exhibited by an intrusion).
3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions
Wemake assumptions regarding the platform’s firmware (e.g., BIOS
or UEFI-compliant firmware) and the OS kernel where we execute
the services. If attackers compromise such components at boot
time or runtime, they could compromise the OS including our
mechanisms. Hence, we assume their integrity. Such assumptions
are reasonable in recent firmware using a hardware-protected root
of trust [26, 58] at boot time and protection of firmware runtime
services [9, 75, 76]. For the OS kernel, one can use UEFI Secure
Boot [69] at boot time, and rely on e.g., security invariants [64] or a
hardware-based integrity monitor [4] at runtime. The main threat
that we address is the compromise of services inside an OS.
We make no assumptions regarding the privileges that were
initially granted to the services. Some of them can restrict their
privileges to the minimum. On the contrary, other services can
be less effective in adopting the principle of least privilege. The
specificity of our approach is that we deliberately remove privi-
leges that could not have been removed initially, since the service
needs them for a function it provides. Finally, we assume that the
attacker cannot compromise the mechanisms we use to checkpoint,
restore, and apply responses (section 4 details how we protect such
mechanisms).
We model an attacker with the following capabilities:
• Can find and exploit a vulnerability in a service,
• Can execute arbitrary code in the same context as the com-
promised service,
1Other files that the service depends on can be modified by another service, we handle
such a case with dependencies information between services.
2However, if components depend on a degraded service, they can be affected indirectly.
• Can perform some malicious behaviors even if the service
had initially the minimum amount of privileges to accom-
plish its functions,
• Can compromise a privileged service or elevate the privileges
of a compromised service to superuser,
• Cannot exploit software-triggered hardware vulnerabilities
(e.g., side-channel attacks [35, 38, 41, 60]),
• Do not have physical access to the platform.
4 ARCHITECTURE AND REQUIREMENTS
Our approach relies on four components. In this section, we first
give an overview of how each component works and interacts with
the others, as illustrated in Figure 2. Then, we detail requirements
about our architecture.
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Figure 2: Overview of the architecture
4.1 Overview
During the normal operation of the OS, the service manager creates
periodic checkpoints of the services and snapshots of the filesystem.
In addition, a logging facility logs the path of all the files modified
by the monitored services since their last checkpoint. The logs are
later used to filter the files that need to be restored.
The IDS notifies the responses selection component when it de-
tects an intrusion and specifies information about possible re-
sponses to withstand it. The selected responses are then given
to the service manager. The service manager restores the infected
service to the last known safe state including all the files modi-
fied by the infected service. Then, it configures kernel-enforced
per-service privilege restrictions and quotas based on the selected
responses. To select the last known safe state, we rely on the IDS
to identify the first alert related to the intrusion. Then, we consider
that the first state prior to this alert is safe.
4.2 Isolation of the Components
For our approach to be able to withstand an attacker trying to
impede the detection and recovery procedures, the integrity and
availability of each component is crucial. Different solutions (e.g., a
hardware isolated execution environment or a hosted hypervisor)
could be used. In our case, we rely on a kernel-based Mandatory
Access Control (MAC) mechanism, such as SELinux [55], to isolate
the components we used in our approach. Such a mechanism is
available in commodity OSs, can express our isolation requirements,
and does not modify the applications. We now give guidelines on
how to build a MAC policy to protect our components.
First, the MAC policy must ensure that none of our components
can be killed.3 Otherwise, e.g., if the responses selection component
is not alive, no responses will be applied.
Second, the MAC policy must ensure that only our components
have access to their isolated storage (e.g., to store the logs or check-
points). Otherwise, attackers might e.g., erase an entry to avoid
restoring a compromised file.
Third, the MAC policy must restrict the communication between
the different components, and it must only allow a specific pro-
gram to advertise itself as one of the components. Otherwise, an
attacker might impersonate a component or stop the communica-
tion between two components. In our case, we assume a Remote
Procedure Call (RPC) or an Inter-Process Communication (IPC)
mechanism that can implement MAC policies (e.g., D-Bus [14] is
SELinux-aware [70]).
4.3 Intrusion Detection System
Our approach requires an IDS to detect an intrusion in a monitored
service. We do not require a specific type of IDS. It can be external
to the system or not. It can be misuse-based or anomaly-based. We
only have two requirements.
First, the IDS should be able to pinpoint the intrusion to a specific
service to apply per-service responses. For example, if the IDS
analyzes event logs to detect intrusions, they should include the
service that triggered the event.
Second, the IDS should have information about the intrusion.
It should map the intrusion to a set of malicious behaviors (e.g.,
the malware capabilities [49] from Malware Attribute Enumera-
tion and Characterization (MAEC) [36]), and it should provide a
set of responses that can stop or withstand them. Both types of
information can either be part of the alert from the IDS or be gener-
ated from threat intelligence based on the alert. Generic responses
can also be inferred due to the type of intrusion if the IDS lacks
precise information about the intrusion. For example, a generic re-
sponse for ransomware consists in setting the filesystem hierarchy
as read-only. Information about the alert, the responses, or mali-
cious behaviors, can be shared using standards such as Structured
Threat Information eXpression (STIX) [6] and MAEC [36, 51].
4.4 Service Manager
Commodity OSs rely on a user space service manager (e.g., the Ser-
vice Control Manager [59] for Windows, or systemd [65] for Linux
distributions) to launch and manage services. In our architecture,
we rely on it, since it provides the appropriate level of abstraction
3One can also use a watchdog to ensure that the components are alive.
to manage services and it has the notion of dependencies between
services. Using such information, we can restore services in a coher-
ent state. If a service depends on other services (e.g., if one service
writes to a file and another one reads it), we checkpoint and restore
them together.
We extend the service manager to checkpoint and restore the
state of services. Furthermore, we modify the service manager
so that it applies responses before it starts a recovered service.
Since such responses are per-service, the service manager must
have access to OS features to configure per-service privileges and
resource quotas.
The service manager must be able to kill a service (i.e., all alive
processes created by the service) if it is compromised and needs
to be restored. Therefore, we bound processes to the service that
created them, and they must not be able to break the bound. For
example, we can use cgroups [24] in Linux or job objects [46] in
Windows.
Finally, the MAC policy must ensure that only the service man-
ager manages the collections of processes (e.g., /sys/fs/cgroup
in Linux). Otherwise, if an attacker breaks the bound of a compro-
mised service, it would be difficult to kill the escaped processes.
Likewise, the MAC policy must protect configuration files used by
the service manager.
5 COST-SENSITIVE RESPONSE SELECTION
For a given intrusion, multiple responses might be appropriate, and
each one incurs an availability cost. We devised a framework to
help select the cost-sensitive responses that minimize such a cost
and maintain the core functions of the service.
We use a qualitative approach using linguistic constants (e.g.,
low or high) instead of a quantitative one (e.g., monetary values).
Quantitative approaches require an accurate value of assets, and
historical data of previous intrusions to be effective, which we as-
sume missing. Qualitative approaches, while prone to biases and
inaccuracies, do not require such data, and are easier to under-
stand [72]. In addition, we would like to limit the input from the
user so that it improves the framework usability and its likelihood
to be adopted in production.
In the rest of this section, we first describe the models that our
framework relies on. Then, we detail how our framework selects
cost-sensitive responses using such models.
5.1 Malicious Behaviors and Responses
Intrusions may exhibit multiple malicious behaviors that need to
be stopped or mitigated differently. Here we work at the level of
a malicious behavior and we select a response for each malicious
behavior.
Our models rely on a hierarchy of malicious behaviors where
the first levels describe high-level behaviors (e.g., compromise data
availability), while lower levels describe more precise behaviors
(e.g., encrypt files). The malware capabilities hierarchy [49] from
the project MAEC [36] of MITRE is a suitable candidate for such
a hierarchy.4 We model this hierarchy as a partially ordered set
4Another project that can help is the MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base [50], but it
does not provide a hierarchy.
(M,≺M) with ≺M a binary relation over the set of malicious be-
haviorsM. The relationm ≺M m′ means thatm is a more precise
behavior thanm′. Let I be the space of intrusions reported by the
IDS. We assume that for each intrusions i ∈ I, we can map the set of
malicious behaviorsMi ⊆ M exhibited by i . By construct, we have
the following property: ifm ≺M m′ thenm ∈ Mi =⇒ m′ ∈ Mi .
We also rely on a hierarchy of responses where the first levels
describe coarse-grained responses (e.g., block the network), while
lower levels describe more fine-grained responses (e.g., block port
80). We define the hierarchy as a partially ordered set (R,≺R) with
≺R a binary relation over the set of responses R (r ≺R r ′ means that
r is a more fine-grained response than r ′). Let Rm ⊆ R be the set of
responses that can stop a malicious behaviorm. By construct, we
have the following property: if r ≺R r ′ then r ∈ Rm =⇒ r ′ ∈ Rm .
Such responses are based on the OS-features available to restrict
privileges and quotas on the system. We provide an example of this
response hierarchy in Figure 4 of Appendix A.
5.2 Cost Models
Let the space of services be denoted S and let the space of qualita-
tive linguistic constants be a totally ordered set, denoted Q com-
posed as follows: none < very low < low < moderate < high <
very high < critical. We extend each service configuration file with
the notion of response cost (in terms of quality of service lost) and
malicious behavior cost that an administrator needs to set.
A response cost cr ∈ Cr ⊆ Q is the qualitative impact of
applying a response r ∈ R on a service to stop a malicious behavior.
We define rcost : S × R → Cr, the function that takes a service, a
response, and returns the associated response cost.
Response costs allow an administrator or developer of a service
to specify how a response, if applied, would impact the overall
quality of service. The impact can be assessed based on the number
of functions that would be unavailable and their importance for
the service. More importantly, with the value critical, we consider
that a response would disable a core function of a service and thus
should never be applied.
For example, the policy of a web server could express that the
ability to listen on ports 80 and 443 is critical for its core functions.
However, if the web server would lose write access to the filesystem,
the cost would be high and not critical, since it can still provide
access to websites for many use cases.
Amalicious behavior cost cmb ∈ Cmb ⊆ Q is the qualitative
impact of a malicious behaviorm ∈ M. We definembcost : S×M→
Cmb, the function that takes a service, a malicious behavior, and
returns the associated cost.
We require for each service that a malicious behavior cost is
set for the first level of the malicious behaviors hierarchy (e.g.,
there are only 20 elements on the first level of the hierarchy from
MAEC). We do not require it for other levels, but if more costs are
set, then the response selection will be more accurate. Thembcost
function associates a cost for each malicious behaviorm. The cost,
however, could be undefined. In such a case, we take the cost ofm′
such thatmbcost(s,m′) is defined,m ≺M m′, and ∄m′′ such that
m < m′′ < m′ withmbcost(s,m′′) defined.
Following the same example, the policy could express that in-
trusions that compromise data availability (e.g., ransomware) have
a high impact for the web server, since it would not provide ac-
cess to the websites anymore. While on the other hand, it could
express that an intrusion that only consumes system resources (e.g.,
a cryptocurrency mining malware) has a moderate cost.
Both costs need to be configured depending on the context of
the service. For example, a web server that provides static content
does not have the same context, hence the same costs than one that
handles transactions.
5.3 Response Performance
While responses have varying costs on the quality of service, they
also differ in performance against a malicious behavior. Hence, in
our framework, we consider the performance as a criterion to select
a response, among others.5
The space of qualitative response performances is denoted Pr ⊆
Q. We define rper f : R×M→ Pr, that takes a response, a malicious
behavior, and returns the associated performance.
In contrast to the cost models previously defined that are specific
to a system and its context (and need to be set, e.g., by an adminis-
trator of the system), such a value only depends on the malicious
behavior and is provided by security experts that analyzed similar
intrusions and proposed responses with their respective perfor-
mance. Such information comes from threat intelligence sources
that are shared, for example, using STIX. For example, STIX has a
property called "efficacy" in its "course-of-action" object that repre-
sent responses.
5.4 Risk Matrix
We rely on the definition of a risk matrix that satisfies the axioms
proposed (i.e., weak consistency, betweenness, and consistent col-
oring) to provide consistent risk assessments [1]. The risk matrix
needs to be defined ahead of time by the administrator depending
on the risk attitude of the organization: whether the organization is
risk averse, risk neutral, or risk seeking. The 5×5 risk matrix shown
in Table 4 of Appendix A is one instantiation of such a matrix.
The risk matrix outputs a qualitative malicious behavior risk
k ∈ K ⊆ Q. The risk matrix depends on a malicious behavior cost
(impact), and on the confidence level icf ∈ Icf ⊆ Q that the IDS
has on the intrusion (likelihood).
We define risk : Cmb×Icf → K, the function representing the risk
matrix that takes a malicious behavior cost, an intrusion confidence,
and returns the associated risk.
5.5 Policy Definition and Inputs
Having discussed the various models we rely on, we can define the
policy as a tuple of four functions ⟨rcost , rper f ,mbcost , risk⟩. The
risk function is defined at the organization level,mbcost and rcost
are defined for each service depending on its context, and rper f
is constant and can be applied for any system. Hence, the most
time-consuming parameters to set arembcost and rcost .
The function mbcost can be defined by someone that under-
stands the impact of malicious behaviors based on the service’s
context (e.g., an administrator). rcost can be defined by an expert,
5The most effective response would be to stop the service. While our model allows it,
in this paper we only mention responses that aim at maintaining the availability.
a developer of the service, or a maintainer of the OS where the ser-
vice is used, since they understand the impact of removing certain
privileges to the service. For example, some Linux distributions
provide the security policies (e.g., SELinux or AppArmor) of their
services and applications. Much like SELinux policies, rcost could
be provided this way, since the maintainers would need to test that
the response do not render a service unusable (i.e., by disabling a
core functionality).
5.6 Optimal Response Selection
We now discuss how we use our policy to select cost-sensitive
responses. Our goal is to maximize the performance of the response
while minimizing the cost to the service. We rely on known MOO
methods [43] to select the most cost-effective response, as does
other work on response selection [52, 62].
For conciseness, since we are selecting a response for a malicious
behaviorm ∈ M and a service s ∈ S, we now denote rper f (r ,m) as
pr , rcost(s, r ) as cr , andmbcost(s,m) as cmb .
5.6.1 Overview. When the IDS triggers an alert, it provides the
confidence icf ∈ Icf of the intrusion i ∈ I and the set of malicious
behaviorsMi ⊆ M. Before selecting an optimal response, we filter
out any response that have a critical response cost from Rm (the
space of responses that can stop a malicious behaviorm). Otherwise,
such responses would impact a core function of the service. We
denote Rˆm ⊆ Rm the resulting set:
Rˆm = { r ∈ Rm | cr < critical }
For each malicious behaviorm ∈ Mi , we compute the Pareto-
optimal set from Rˆm , where we select an optimal response from.
We now describe these last steps.
5.6.2 Pareto-Optimal Set. In contrast to a Single-Objective Opti-
mization (SOO) problem, a MOO problem does not generally have
a single global solution. For instance, in our case we might not
have a response that provides both the maximum performance and
the minimum cost, because they are conflicting, but rather a set
of solutions that are defined as optimum. A common concept to
describe such solutions is Pareto optimality.
A solution is Pareto-optimal (non-dominated) if it is not possible
to find other solutions that improve one objective without weaken-
ing another one. The set of all Pareto-optimal solutions is called a
Pareto-optimal set (or Pareto front). More formally, in our context,
we say that a response is Pareto-optimal if it is non-dominated. A
response r ∈ Rm dominates a response r ′ ∈ Rm , denoted r ≻ r ′, if
the following is satisfied:
[pr > pr ′ ∧ cr ≤ cr ′] ∨ [pr ≥ pr ′ ∧ cr < cr ′]
MOO methods rely on preferences to choose solutions among
the Pareto-optimal set (e.g., should we put the priority on the perfor-
mance of the response or on reducing the cost?) [43]. They rely on
a scalarization that converts a MOO problem into a SOO problem.
One common scalarization approach is the weighted sum method
that assigns a weight to each objective and compute the sum of the
product of their respective objective. However, this method is not
guaranteed to always give solutions in the Pareto-optimal set [43].
Shameli-Sendi et al. [62] decided to apply the weighted sum
method on the Pareto-optimal set instead of on the whole solution
space to guarantee to have a solution in the Pareto-optimal set. We
apply the same reasoning, so we reduce our set to all non-dominated
responses. We denote the resulting Pareto-optimal set O:
O = { ri ∈ Rˆm | ∄r j ∈ Rˆm , r j ≻ ri }
5.6.3 Response Selection. Before selecting a response from the
Pareto-optimal set using use the weighted sum method, we need
to set weights, and to convert the linguistic constants, we use to
define the costs, into numerical values.
We rely on a function l that maps the linguistic constants to
a numerical value6 between 0 and 1. In our case, we convert the
constants critical, very high, high, moderate, low, very low, and
none, to respectively the value 1, 0.9, 0.8, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1, and 0.
For the weights, we use the risk k = risk(cmb , icf ) as a weight
for the performance of the responsewp = l(k) which also gives us
the weight for the cost of a responsewc = 1−wp . It means that we
prioritize the performance if the risk is high, while we prioritize
the cost if the risk is low.
We obtain the final optimal response by applying the weighted
sum method:
argmax
r ∈O
wpl(pr ) +wc (1 − l(cr ))
6 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented a Linux-based prototype by modifying several
existing projects. While our implementation relies on Linux fea-
tures such as namespaces [31], seccomp [10], or cgroups [24], our
approach does not depend on OS-specific paradigms. For example,
on Windows, one could use Integrity Mechanism [45], Restricted
Tokens [48], and Job Objects [46]. In the rest of this section, we
describe the projects we modified, why we rely on them, and the
different modifications we made to implement our prototype. You
can see in Table 1 the different projects we modified where we
added in total nearly 3600 lines of C code.
Table 1: Projects modified for our implementation
Project From version Code added
CRIU 3.9 383 lines of C
systemd 239 2639 lines of C
audit
user space 2.8.3 79 lines of C
Linux kernel 4.17.5 460 lines of C
Total 3561 lines of C
At the time of writing, the most common service manager on
Linux-based systems is systemd [65]. We modified it to checkpoint
and to restore services using CRIU [12] and snapper [63], and to
apply responses at the end of the restoration.
6An alternative would be to use fuzzy logic to reflect the uncertainty regarding the
risk assessment from experts when using linguistic constants [15].
6.1 Checkpoint and Restore
CRIU is a checkpoint and restore project implemented in user space
for Linux. It can checkpoint the state of an application by fetching
information about it from different kernel APIs, and then store this
information inside an image. CRIU reuses this image and other
kernel APIs to restore the application. We chose CRIU because it
allows us to perform transparent checkpointing and restoring (i.e.,
without modification or recompilation) of the services.
Snapper provides an abstraction for snapshotting filesystems
and handles multiple Linux filesystems (e.g., BTRFS [57]). It can
create a comparison between a snapshot and another one (or the
current state of the filesystem). In our implementation, we chose
BTRFS due its Copy-On-Write (COW) snapshot and comparison
features, allowing a fast snapshotting and comparison process.
When checkpointing a service, we first freeze its cgroup (i.e., we
remove the processes from the scheduling queue) to avoid incon-
sistencies. Thus, it cannot interact with other processes nor with
the filesystem. Second, we take a snapshot of the filesystem and a
snapshot of the metadata of the service kept by systemd (e.g., status
information). Third, we checkpoint the processes of the service
using CRIU. Finally, we unfreeze the service.
When restoring a service, we first kill all the processes belonging
to its cgroup. Second, we restore the metadata of the service and ask
snapper to create a read-only snapshot of the current state of the
filesystem. Then, we ask snapper to perform a comparison between
this snapshot and the snapshot taken during the checkpointing of
the service. It gives us information about which files were modified
and how. Since we want to only recover the files modified by the
monitored service, we filter the result based on our log of files
modified by this specific service (see section 6.3 for more details)
and restore the final list of files. Finally, we restore the processes
using CRIU. Before unfreezing the restored service, CRIU calls back
our function that applies the responses. We apply the responses
at the end to avoid interfering with CRIU that requires certain
privileges to restore processes.
6.2 Responses
Our implementation relies on Linux features such as namespaces,
seccomp, or cgroups, to apply responses. Here is a non-exhaustive
list of responses that we support: filesystem constraints (e.g., put
all or any part of the filesystem read-only), system call filters (e.g.,
blacklisting a list or a category of system calls), network socket
filters (e.g., deny access to a specific IP address), or resource con-
straints (e.g., CPU quotas or limit memory consumption).
We modified systemd to apply most of these responses just be-
fore unfreezing the restored service, except for system call filters.
Seccomp only allows processes to set up their own filters and pre-
vent them to modify the filters of other processes. Therefore, we
modified systemd so that when CRIU restores a process, it injects
and executes code inside the address space of the restored process
to set up our filters.
6.3 Monitoring Modified Files
The Linux auditing system [3, 29] is a standard way to trigger
events from the kernel to user space based on a set of rules. Linux
audit can trigger events when a process performs write accesses
on the filesystem. However, it cannot filter these events for a set of
processes corresponding to a given service (i.e., a cgroup). Hence,
we modified the kernel side of Linux audit to perform such filtering
in order to only log files modified by the monitored services. Then,
we specified a monitoring rule that relies on such filtering.
We developed a userland daemon that listens to an audit netlink
socket and processes the events generated by our monitoring rules.
Then, by parsing them, our daemon can log which files a mon-
itored service modified. To that end, we create a file hierarchy
under a per-service private directory. For example, if the service
abc.service modified the file /a/b/c/test, we create an empty
file /private/abc.service/a/b/c/test. This solution allows us
to log modified files without keeping a data structure in memory.
7 EVALUATION
We performed an experimental evaluation of our approach to an-
swer the following questions:
(1) How effective are our responses at stopping malicious be-
haviors in case a service is compromised?
(2) How effective is our approach at selecting cost-sensitive
responses that withstand an intrusion?
(3) What is the impact of our solution on the availability or
responsiveness of the services?
(4) How much overhead our solution incurs on the system re-
sources?
(5) Do services continue to function (i.e., no crash) when they
are restored with less privileges that they initially needed?
For the experiments, we installed Fedora Server 28 with the
Linux kernel 4.17.5, and we compiled the programs with GCC 8.1.1.
We ran the experiments that used live malware in a virtualized
environment to control malware propagation (see Appendix B.1
for more details). While malware could use anti-virtualization tech-
niques [8, 56], to the best of our knowledge, none of our samples
used such techniques.7 We executed the rest of the experiments
on bare metal on a computer with an AMD PRO A12-8830B R7 at
2.5GHz, 12GiB of RAM, and a 128GB Intel SSD 600p Series.
Throughout the experiments, we tested our implementation
on different types of services, such as web servers (nginx [53],
Apache [2]), database (mariadb [42]), work queue (beanstalkd [7]),
message queue (mosquitto [19]), or git hosting services (gitea [21]).
It shows that our approach is applicable to a diverse set of services.
7.1 Responses Effectiveness
Our first experiments focus on how effective our responses against
distinct types of intrusions are. We are not interested, per se, in
the vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit, but on how to stop at-
tackers from performing malicious actions after they have infected
a service. Here we do not focus on response selection, which is
discussed in section 7.2.
The following list describes themalware and attacks used (see Ap-
pendix B.2 for the hashes of the malware samples):
7This is consistent with the study of Cozzi et al. [11] that showed that in the 10 548
Linux malware they studied, only 0.24% of them tried to detect if they were in a
virtualized environment.
Linux.BitCoinMiner Cryptocurrency mining malware that con-
nects to a mining pool using attackers-controlled creden-
tials [68].
Linux.Rex.1 Malware that joins a Peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet to re-
ceive instructions to scan systems for vulnerabilities to repli-
cate itself, elevate privileges by scanning for credentials on
the machine, participate in a Distributed Denial-of-Service
(DDoS) attack, or send spam [17].
Hakai Malware that receives instructions from a Command and
Control (C&C) server to launch DDoS attacks, and to in-
fect other systems by brute forcing credentials or exploiting
vulnerabilities in routers [18, 54].
Linux.Encoder.1 Encryption ransomware that encrypts files com-
monly found on Linux servers (e.g., configuration files, or
HTML files), and other media-related files (e.g., JPG, or MP3),
while ensuring that the system can boot so that the adminis-
trator can see the ransom note [16].
GoAhead exploit Exploit that gives remote code execution to an
attacker on all versions of the GoAhead embeddedweb server
prior to 3.6.5 [25].
Our work does not focus on detecting intrusions but on how to
recover from and withstand them. Hence, we selected a diverse set
of malware and attacks that covered various malicious behaviors,
with different malicious behaviors.
For each experiment, we start a vulnerable service, we check-
point its state, we infect it, and we wait for the payload to execute
(e.g., encrypt files). Then, we apply our responses and we evaluate
their effectiveness. We consider the restoration successful if the
service is still functioning and its state corresponds to the one that
has been checkpointed. Finally, we consider the responses effective
if we cannot reinfect the service or if the payload cannot achieve
its goals anymore.
Table 2: Summary of the experiments that evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the responses against various malicious behav-
iors
Attack Scenario Malicious Behavior Per-serviceResponse Policy
Linux.BitCoinMiner Mine for cryptocurrency Ban mining pool IPs
Linux.BitCoinMiner Mine for cryptocurrency Reduce CPU quota
Linux.Rex.1 Determine C&C server Ban bootstrapping IPs
Hakai Receive data from C&C Ban C&C servers’ IPs
Linux.Encoder.1 Encrypt data Read-only filesystem
GoAhead exploit Exfiltrate via network Forbid connect syscall
GoAhead exploit Data theft Render paths inaccessible
The results we obtained are summarized in Table 2. In each
experiment, as expected, our solution successfully restored the
service after the intrusion to a previous safe state. In addition, as
expected, each response was able to withstand a reinfection for
its associated malicious behavior and only impacted the specific
service and not the rest of the system.
7.2 Cost-Sensitive Response Selection
Our second set of experiments focus on how effective is our ap-
proach at selecting cost-sensitive responses. We chose Gitea, a
self-hosted Git-repository hosting service (an open source clone of
the services provided by GitHub [22]), as a use case for a service.
We chose Gitea, because it requires a diverse set of privileges and
it shows how our approach can be applied to a complex real-world
service.
In our use case, we configured Gitea with the principle of least
privileges. It means that restrictionswhich corresponds to responses
with a cost assigned to none are initially applied to the service (e.g.,
Gitea can only listen on port 80 and 443 or Gitea have only access
to the directories and files it needs). Even if the service follows the
best practices and is properly protected, an intrusion can still do
damages and our approach handles such cases.
We consider an intrusion that compromised our Gitea service
with the Linux.Encoder.1 ransomware.8 When executed, it en-
crypts all the git repositories and the database used by Gitea. Hence,
we previously configured the policy to set the cost of such a mali-
cious behavior to high,9 since it would render the site almost unus-
able:mbcost("gitea", "compromise-data-availability") = "high".
Since our focus is not on intrusion detection, we assume that
the IDS detected the ransomware. This assumption is reasonable
with, for example, several techniques to detect ransomware such
as API call monitoring, file system activity monitoring, or the use
of decoy resources [32].
In practice, however, an IDS can generate false positives, or it
can provide non-accurate values for the likelihood of the intrusion
leading to a less adequate response. Hence, we consider three cases
to evaluate the response selection: the IDS detected the intrusion
and accurately set the likelihood, the IDS detected the intrusion
but not with an accurate likelihood, and the IDS generated a false
positive.
In Table 3, we display a set of responses for the ransomware that
we devised based on existing strategies to mitigate ransomware,
such as CryptoDrop lockdown [13] or Windows controlled folder
access [47]. None of them could have been applied proactively by
the developer, because they degrade the quality of service. We set
their respective cost for the service and the estimated performance.
Table 3: Responses to withstand ransomware reinfection
with their associated cost and performance for Gitea
# Response Cost Performance
1 Disable open system call Very High Very High
2 Read-only filesystem except sessions folder High Very High
3 Paths of git repositories inaccessible High Moderate
4 Read-only paths of all git repositories Moderate Moderate
5 Read-only paths of important git repositories Low Low
6 Read-only filesystem Critical Very High
Now let us consider the three cases previously mentioned. In
the first case, the IDS detected the intrusion and considered the
intrusion very likely. After computing the Pareto-optimal set, we
have three possible responses left (2, 4, and 5). The risk computed
is risk("high", "very likely") = high. The response selection then
prioritizes performance and selects the response 2 that sets the
8In our experiments, we used an exploit for the version 1.4.0 [66].
9One would have to assign a cost for other malicious behaviors, but for the sake of
conciseness we only show the relevant ones.
filesystem as read-only protecting all information stored by Gitea
(git repositories and its database). The only exception is the folder
used by Gitea to store sessions since having this folder read-only
would render the site unusable, thus it is a core function (see the cost
critical in Table 3). Gitea is restored with all the encrypted files. The
selected response prevents the attacker to reinfect the service since
the exploit require write accesses. In terms of quality of service,
users can connect to the service and clone repositories, but due
to the response a new user cannot register and users cannot push
to repositories. Hence, this response is adequate since the service
cannot get reinfected, core functions are maintained, and other
functions previously mentioned are available.
In the second case, the IDS detected the intrusion but considered
the intrusion very unlikely while the attacker managed to infect the
service. The risk computed is risk("high", "very unlikely") = low.
The response selection then prioritizes cost and selects the response
5 that sets a subset of git repositories (the most important ones
for the organization) as read-only. With this response, the attacker
managed to reinfect the service and the ransomware encrypted
many repositories, but not the most important ones. In terms of
quality of service, users can still access the protected repositories,
but due to the intrusion users cannot login anymore and they cannot
clone the encrypted repositories (i.e., Gitea shows an error to the
user). Hence, the response is less adequate when the IDS provides an
incorrect value for the likelihood of the intrusion, since the malware
managed to encrypt many repositories, but the core functions of
Gitea are maintained.
In the third case, the IDS detected an intrusion with the likeli-
hood being very unlikely, but it is in fact a false positive. The risk
computed is risk("high", "very unlikely") = low. It is similar to the
previous case where the response selected is response 5 due to a
low risk. However, in this case, there is no actual ransomware. In
terms of quality of service, users have access to most functions (e.g.,
login, clone all repositories, or add issues), they just cannot push
modifications to the protected repositories. It shows that even with
false positives, our approach minimizes the impact on the quality
of service. Once an analyst classified the alert as a false positive,
the administrator can make the service leave the degraded mode.
7.3 Availability Cost
In this subsection, we detail the experiments that evaluate the
availability cost for the checkpoint and restore procedures.
7.3.1 Checkpoint. Each time we checkpoint a service, we freeze its
processes. As a result, a user might notice a slower responsiveness
from the service. Hence, we measured the time to checkpoint four
common services: Apache HTTP server (v2.4.33), nginx (v1.12.1),
mariadb (v10.2.16), and beanstalkd (v1.10). We repeated the experi-
ment 10 times for each service. In average the time to checkpoint
was always below 300ms. Table 6 of Appendix B.3 gives more
detailed timings.
The results show that our checkpointing has a small, but ac-
ceptable availability cost. We do not lose any connection, we only
increase the requests’ latency when the service is frozen. Since the
latency increases only for a small period of time (maximum 300ms),
we consider such a cost acceptable. In comparison, SHELF [74]
incurs a 7.6 % latency overhead for Apache during the whole exe-
cution of the system.
7.3.2 Restore. We also evaluated the time to restore the same ser-
vices used in section 7.3.1. In average, it took less than 325ms.
Table 7 of Appendix B.3 gives more detailed timings.
In contrast to the checkpoint, the restore procedure loses all
connections due to the kill operation. The experiment, however,
show that the time to restore a service is small (less than 325ms).
For example, in comparison, CRIU-MR [71] took 2.8 s in average to
complete their restoration procedure.
7.4 Monitoring Cost
As detailed in section 6.3, our solution logs the path of any file
modified by a monitored service. This monitoring, however, incurs
an overhead for every process executing on the system (i.e., even for
the non-monitored services). There is also an additional overhead
for monitored services that perform write accesses due to the audit
event generated by the kernel and then processed by our daemon.
Therefore, we evaluated both overhead by running synthetic and
real-world workload benchmarks, from the Phoronix test suite [40],
for three different cases:
(1) no monitoring is present (baseline)
(2) monitoring rule enabled, but the service running the bench-
marks is not monitored (no audit events are triggered)
(3) monitoring rule enabled and the service ismonitored (audit
events are triggered).
7.4.1 Synthetic Benchmarks. We ran synthetic I/O benchmarks
that stress the system by performing many open, read, and write
system calls: compilebench [44], fs-mark [73], and Postmark [30].
compilebench emulates disk I/O operations related to the compi-
lation of a kernel tree, reading the tree, or its creation. fs-mark
creates files and directories, at a given rate and size, either syn-
chronously or asynchronously. Postmark emulates an email server
by performing a given number of transactions that create, read,
append to, and delete files of varying sizes.
The results of the read compiled tree test of the compilebench
benchmark confirmed that the overhead is only due to open sys-
tem calls with write access mode. This test only reads files and we
did not observe any noticeable overhead (less than 1 %, within the
margin of error).
We now focus on the results of the fs-mark and Postmark bench-
marks, illustrated in Figure 3. In both experiments, we notice a
small overhead when the service is not monitored (between 0.6 %
and 4.5 %). With fs-mark (Figure 3a), when writing 1000 files syn-
chronously, we observe a 7.3 % overhead. In comparison, when the
files are written asynchronously, there is a 27.3 % overhead. With
Postmark (Figure 3b), we observe a high overhead (28.7 %) when it
writes many small files (between 5 KiB and 512 KiB) but remains
low (3.1 %) with bigger files (between 512 KiB and 1MiB).
In summary, these synthetic benchmarks show that the worst
case for our monitoring is when a monitored service writes many
small files asynchronously in burst.
7.4.2 Real-world Workload Benchmarks. To have a different per-
spective than the synthetic benchmarks, we chose two benchmarks
that use real-world workloads: build-linux-kernelmeasures the
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Figure 3: Results of synthetic benchmarks to measure the
overhead of the monitoring
time to compile the Linux kernel10 and unpack-linux measures
the time to extract the archive of the Linux kernel source code.
When the service is monitored, the overhead is only significant
with unpack-linux where we observe a 23.7 % overhead. It con-
curs with our results from the synthetic benchmarks: writing many
small files asynchronously incurs a significant overhead when the
service is monitored (the time to decompress a file in this bench-
mark is negligible). With build-linux-kernel, we observe a small
overhead (1.1 %) even when the service is monitored (the time to
compile the source code masks the overhead of the monitoring).
In comparison, SHELF [74] has a 65 % overhead when extracting
the archive of the Linux kernel source code, and an 8 % overhead
when building this kernel.
In conclusion, both the synthetic and non-synthetic benchmarks
show that our solution is more suitable for workloads that do not
write many small files asynchronously in burst. For instance, our
approach would be best suited to protect services such as web,
databases, or video encoding services.
10While build-linux-kernel is CPU bound, it also performs many system calls, such
as opening files to store the output of the compilation.
7.5 Storage Space Overhead
Checkpointing services requires storage space to save the check-
points. To evaluate the disk usage overhead, we checkpointed the
same four services used in section 7.3.1. Each checkpoint took re-
spectively 26.2MiB, 7.5MiB, 136.0MiB, and 130.1 KiB of storage
space. The memory pages dumps took at least 95.3 % of the size of
their checkpoint. Hence, if a service uses more memory under load
(e.g., Apache), its checkpoint would take more storage space.
7.6 Stability of Degraded Services
We tested our solution on web servers (nginx, Apache), databases
(mariadb), work queues (beanstalkd), message queues (mosquitto),
and git hosting services (gitea). None of the services crashed when
restored with a policy that removed privileged that they required
(i.e., in a degraded mode). The reason is twofold.
First, we provided a policy that specified the responses with
a critical cost. Therefore, our solution never selected a response
that removes a privilege needed by a core function. Second, the
services checked for errors when performing various operations.
For example, if a service needed a privilege that we removed, it
tried to perform the operation and failed, but only logged an error
and did not crash. If we generalize our results, it means our solution
will not make other services (that we did not test) crash if they
properly check for error cases. This practice is common, and it is
often highlighted by the compiler when this is not the case.
8 DISCUSSION
Let us now discuss non-exhaustively limitations or areas that would
need further work.
False Positives Our approach relies on an IDS, hence we inherit
its limitations. In the case of false positives, the recovery and
response procedures would impact the service availability,
despite thwarting no threat. Our approach, however, mini-
mizes this risk by considering the likelihood of the intrusion
for the selection of cost-sensitive responses and by ensuring
that we maintain core functions.
CRIU Limitations At the moment, CRIU cannot support all ap-
plications, since it has issues when handling external re-
sources or graphical applications. For example, if a process
has opened a device to have direct access to some hard-
ware, checkpointing its state may be impossible (except for
virtual devices not corresponding to any physical devices).
Since our implementation relies on CRIU, we inherit its lim-
itations. Therefore, at the moment, our implementation is
better suited for system services that do not have a graphical
part and do not require direct access to some hardware.
Service Dependencies In our work, at the moment, we only use
the service dependency graph provided by the service man-
ager (e.g., systemd) to recover and checkpoint dependent
services together. We could also use this same graph to pro-
vide more precise response selection by taking into account
the dependency between services, their relative importance,
and to propagate the impact a malicious behavior can have.
It could be used as a weight (in addition to the risk) to select
optimal responses. Similar, but network-based, approaches
have been heavily studied in the past [33, 62, 67].
Models Input For our cost-sensitive response selection, we first
need to associate an intrusion to a set of malicious behav-
iors, and the course of action to stop these behaviors. While
standards exist to share threat information [6] and malicious
behaviors [36, 49, 51] exhibited by malware, or attackers in
general, we were not able to find open sources that provided
them directly for the samples we used. This issue might be
related to the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, no
industry solution would exploit such information. In our
experiments, we extracted information about malicious be-
haviors from textual descriptions [16–18, 54, 68] and reused
the existing standards to describe such malicious behav-
iors [36, 49, 51]. Likewise, we extracted information about
responses to counter such malicious behaviors from textual
descriptions [13, 16–18, 47, 54, 68].
Generic Responses If we do not have precise information about
the intrusion, but only a generic behavior or category associ-
ated to it (one of the top elements in the malicious behaviors
hierarchy), we can automatically consider generic responses.
For example, with ransomware we know that responses that
either render the filesystem read-only or only specific di-
rectories will work. We would not know that, for instance,
blocking a specific system call would have stopped the mal-
ware, but we know what all ransomware need, and we can
respond accordingly. Such generic responses might help mit-
igate the lack of precise information.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
This work provides an intrusion survivability approach for com-
modity OSs. In contrast to other intrusion recovery approaches,
our solution is not limited to restoring files or processes, but it
also applies responses to withstand a potential reinfection. Such
responses enforce per-service privilege restrictions and resource
quotas to ensure that the rest of the system is not directly impacted.
In addition, we only restore the files modified by the infected ser-
vice to limit the restoration time. We devised a framework to select
cost-sensitive responses that do not disable core functions of ser-
vices. We specified the requirements for our approach and proposed
an architecture satisfying its requirements. Finally, we developed
and evaluated a prototype for Linux-based systems by modifying
systemd, Linux audit, CRIU, and the Linux kernel. Our results show
that our prototype withstands known Linux attacks. Our prototype
only induces a small overhead, except with I/O-intensive services
that create many small files asynchronously in burst.
In the future, we would like to investigate how we could au-
tomatically adapt the system to gradually remove the responses
that we applied to withstand a reinfection. Such a process involves
being able to automatically fix the vulnerabilities or to render them
non-exploitable.
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A EXAMPLES OF MODELS
Figure 4 is an example of a non-exhaustive per-service response
hierarchy that can be used for the hierarchy defined in section 5.1.
Note that for each response with arguments (e.g., read-only paths
or blacklisting IP addresses), the hierarchy provides a sub-response
with a subset of the arguments. For example, if there is a response
that puts /var read-only, there is also the responses that puts
/var/www read-only. It means that if an administrator only specified
the cost of putting /var read-only, but a response, among the set of
possible responses, sets /var/www read-only, our response selection
framework uses the cost of its parent (i.e., /var).
Per-service responses
Filesystem
Read-only filesystem
Read-only path
Read-only subpath
Inaccessible path
System calls
Blacklist any system call
Blacklist a list or a category of system calls
Blacklist a syscall with specific arguments
Capabilities
Deny a set of capabilities
Network
Disable network
Blacklist any IP address
Blacklist IP address range
Blacklist IP address
Blacklist any port
Blacklist port range
Blacklist port
Restrict address families
Devices
Isolate device
Resources
Limit the number of tasks
CPU quota
Limit memory consumption
I/O quota
Figure 4: Example of a non-exhaustive per-service response
hierarchy
Table 4 is an example of a risk matrix that can be used. This
matrix can vary depending on the risk attitude (risk averse, risk
neutral, or risk seeking).
Table 4: Example of a 5 × 5 risk matrix that follows the re-
quirements for our risk assessment
Malicious Behavior Cost
Confidence
(Likelihood) Very low Low Moderate High Very high
Very likely L M H H H
Likely L M M H H
Probable L L M M H
Unlikely L L L M M
Very unlikely L L L L L
B EVALUATION DETAILS
B.1 Setup of the Virtualized Environment
We ran the experiments regarding the effectiveness of our responses
in a virtualized environment. It helped us control malware propa-
gation and their behavior in general.
The setup consisted of an isolated network connected to the
Internet with multiple Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), two
Virtual Machines (VMs), and a workstation. We executed the in-
fected service on a VM connected to an isolated VLAN with access
to the Internet. We connected the second VM, that executes the net-
work sniffing tool (tcpdump), to another VLAN with port mirroring
from the first VLAN. Finally, the workstation, connected to another
isolated VLAN, had access to the server managing the VMs, the
VM with the infected service, and the network traces.
B.2 Malware Samples
Table 5: Malware used in our experiments with the SHA-256
hash of the samples
Malware SHA-256
Linux.BitCoinMiner 690aea53dae908c9afa933d60f467a17ec5f72463988eb5af5956c6cb301455b
Linux.Rex.1 762a4f2bf5ea4ff72fce674da1adf29f0b9357be18de4cd992d79198c56bb514
Linux.Encoder.1 18884936d002839833a537921eb7ebdb073fa8a153bfeba587457b07b74fb3b2
Hakai 58a5197e1c438ca43ffc3739160fd147c445012ba14b3358caac1dc8ffff8c9f
In Table 5, we list the malware samples used in our experiments
alongside their respective SHA-256 hash.
B.3 Checkpoint and Restore Operations
In Figure 5, we illustrate the results of the availability cost that
users could perceive by measuring the latencies of HTTP requests
made to an nginx server. We generated 100 requests per second for
20 seconds with the HTTP load testing tool Vegeta [61]. During this
time, we checkpointed nginx at approximately 5, 11, and 16 seconds.
We repeated the experiment three times. The output gave us the
latency of each request, and we applied a moving average filter
with a window size of 5. As mentioned previously, all requests were
successful (i.e., no errors or timeouts) and the maximum latency
during a checkpoint was 286ms.
In Table 6, we show the time measured to perform the different
operations executed during a checkpoint: initialize (i.e., to initialize
structures, to create or open directories, and to freeze processes),
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Figure 5: Impact of checkpoints on the latency of HTTP re-
quests made to an nginx server (less is better)
snapshot of the filesystem, serialization of the service’s metadata,
and checkpointing of the processes using CRIU. The time to perform
this last operation varies depending on the service (e.g., the number
of processes, memory used, or files opened).
Table 6: Time to perform the checkpoint operations of a ser-
vice
Checkpoint Operation Mean Standarddeviation
Standard error
of the mean
Service-independent operations
Initialize (µs) 643.20 90.75 14.35
Checkpoint service metadata (µs) 51.47 8.45 1.33
Snapshot filesystem (ms) 98.95 1.38 2.19
Checkpoint processes (CRIU)
httpd (ms) 199.24 11.05 3.49
nginx (ms) 51.59 3.99 1.26
mariadb (ms) 171.77 8.52 2.69
beanstalkd (ms) 16.25 1.37 0.43
Total
httpd (ms) 298.88
nginx (ms) 151.24
mariadb (ms) 271.41
beanstalkd (ms) 115.89
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